Comparative Humanities Review
Volume 3 Translation: Comparative Perspectives
(Spring 2009)

Article 9

2009

Radio as a Tool of the State: Radio Moscow and
the Early Cold War
Mark D. Winek
American University

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.bucknell.edu/chr
Recommended Citation
Winek, Mark D. (2009) "Radio as a Tool of the State: Radio Moscow and the Early Cold War ," Comparative Humanities Review: Vol. 3,
Article 9.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.bucknell.edu/chr/vol3/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bucknell Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Comparative Humanities
Review by an authorized administrator of Bucknell Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcadmin@bucknell.edu.

Radio as a Tool
of the State:
Radio Moscow and
the Early Cold War
Mark D. Winek
American University

Scanning the airwaves, all that could be found was static.
And then, one minute before the hour, through the disturbance
came the notes of “Moscow Nights”. Perhaps elsewhere the Cold
War was frigid and stale, but here, over high frequency radio, the
Cold War was hot. Radio Moscow played a leading role in that hot
war over the airwaves – just as much as the Voice of America,
Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty. Yet, very little has
surfaced in the West regarding the role of Radio Moscow in the
Cold War. My paper works to analyze this significant player in the
battle between the United States and the Soviet Union. I explore
the organization and programming of Radio Moscow and its
connection to the Soviet Government. In addition, I seek to
analyze its reception in the United States and, most importantly,
how it was used as a vehicle of Soviet foreign policy around the
world.
Early Broadcasting in Russia (to 1941)
From a very early time, the leadership of the revolutionary
Bolshevik party in Russia recognized the importance of mass
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communication, a point only strengthened after the October
Revolution of 1917. Soon after the creation of the Soviet
Government in Moscow, the Department of Agitation and
Propaganda was set up to coordinate and control all the media
outlets in the nation. 1 While the new government recognized the
importance of newspapers and magazines, they jumped on the new
technology that could spread their word most effectively to a
population spread out over 6.6 million square miles.
Radio would soon have the capacity to spread information
about health, sanitation, and agriculture, as well as the message of
the central government across the vastness of Soviet territory.2
With Lenin’s message of world revolution, radio could spread the
movement into Europe and Africa. Within two years of the
establishment of a Moscow radio laboratory in 1922, ten stations
were in operation in the Soviet Union. While stations were
allowed to be established by organizations and collectives, radio
broadcasting effectively remained in the hands of the Soviet
government.3 As the new state evolved, the Soviet leadership
recognized the need for international broadcasting. The creation of
Radio Moscow filled this need. Established in 1929 with French,
English, and German language services, programming expanded
with Swedish, Turkish, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, Hungarian,
Czech, and Russian services by 1932.4 Like domestic
programming, Radio Moscow expounded the successes of the
1917 Revolution and the recent accomplishments of the Soviet
Government.
Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)
By the end of the 1930s, the Soviet Union faced new
challenges on its borders, particularly to the west. Adolf Hitler’s
territorial expansion into Austria, Czechoslovakia and even farther
east was making the Soviet leadership nervous. The Molotov-
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Ribbentrop Pact kept the Germans at bay until the Nazi invasion of
June 22, 1941.
As German forces invaded Soviet territory as a part of
Operation Barbarossa, they entered a country that had experienced
great gains in the radio field. Over 100 broadcast stations were
found across the country.5 However, the June invasion caught the
Soviet government by surprise, giving the state’s broadcast
apparatus little time to join the war footing. Still, Radio Moscow
managed to establish broadcasting to German-occupied territories
in their own languages early in the war.6 The increased
broadcasting over distances and construction of new, powerful
stations would serve Radio Moscow well over the war and postwar years.
Though reaching occupied territories as well as the
expanses of Soviet territory with the government’s message was
important, the Soviet leadership recognized the importance of
counteracting German radio. The war of the airwaves was
characterized by premature declarations of victory, reports of
atrocities on the opposing side, and accounts of conditions on the
enemy’s home front. Early in the war, the Germans took the upper
hand over the feeble attempts by Radio Moscow to counteract their
claims. However, by 1942, Moscow had managed to gain listener
trust. As James von Geldern notes, the factors included, “relative
reliability, the willingness to trust listeners to reach their own
conclusions, and improved fortunes of war”.7
Indeed, the Soviets had gained the upper hand. Though the
Great Patriotic War left nearly 14% of the Soviet population as
casualties, it also left the propaganda apparatus of the Soviet state
in a revitalized condition. Wartime broadcasting boosted Radio
Moscow’s staff to thirteen native broadcasters capable of
producing programming in most European languages.8 The station
included a strong German language department, particularly useful
in the coming decades of post-war occupation of Germany.
5
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Finally, technology had been upgraded, providing Radio Moscow
with facilities to reach most of the Eurasian continent. By 1945,
Radio Moscow was broadcasting in 29 different languages.9
Expansion of International Broadcasting during the Early
Cold War (1945-1965)
While Victory in Europe and later Victory in Japan ended
the shooting war in 1945, another battle was just beginning. The
wartime relationship between the Soviet Union and the western
allies had always been plagued by some mutual mistrust. This
mistrust soon escalated as the occupation of conquered territories
progressed.
To meet the escalation of tensions between the Soviet
Union and the west, Radio Moscow continued to increase its
broadcast capabilities and target populations. The first addition to
Radio Moscow’s language services was Korean in 1946, followed
closely by Uighur and Mongolian. The Korean service became
particularly important with the occupation of the northern half of
the Korean Peninsula by the Red Army and the beginning of the
Korean Conflict in 1951. Language services to the Indian
Subcontinent and South Asia were also added in the late 1940s and
early 1950s.10
Radio Moscow also expanded many of its preexisting
language services to serve new requirements. At the end of the
1940s, the Arabic service moved from broadcasting 7.5 hours per
week to 42 hours per week, one of Radio Moscow’s largest.
Persian language broadcasting increased to 31.5 hours per week in
1950, and Turkish to 31¼ per week. European language
broadcasts also expanded, however, they tended to favor Western
Europe. Weekly broadcasts in English expanded to 38 hours,
French to 28 hours, and German to 55 hours per week. Italian and
Finnish language services also experienced modest increases.
Surprisingly, weekly broadcasts to Yugoslavia were cut nearly by
half, while broadcasts to Czechoslovakia were completely cut.
9
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Similarly, the end of the 1940s brought a cut of 10 hours from the
Mandarin Chinese service to 14 hours per week.11
In response to Radio Moscow and other Soviet
broadcasters, the United States also stepped up broadcasting to
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. By 1956, the Voice of
America was broadcasting more than 300 hours per week to the
Soviet Union. Radio Liberation (changed in 1963 to Radio
Liberty) was established in 1951 by the United States to broadcast
to the Soviet Union in Russian and other Soviet languages. It
began with a 20-minute Russian program repeated for 12 hours a
day. By 1957, it had increased to speaking 17 Soviet languages
from 11 transmitters. At the same time, Radio Free Europe began
speaking to Eastern Europe. By 1954, it was broadcasting 124¾
hours a week to Poland alone.12
These increases in broadcasting hours by both sides began
the Cold War radio battles. As global crises evolved and other
nations joined or left spheres of influence, language services and
their weekly outputs changed to reflect the situation. The
developing African independence movements in the late 1950s and
1960s changed Radio Moscow’s meager African services, adding
Portuguese and 11 African languages, including Somali, Zulu, and
Malagasy. English and French language output for the African
continent was also increased by the end of the decade.13
Purpose of International Political Broadcasting and Radio
Moscow
In today’s capitalist market, large and small businesses
recognize the need for a public image and dissemination of
information about their services. Many use word of mouth,
billboards, and radio and television spots to inform potential
customers. Likewise, since the beginning of the modern system of
international politics, nation-states have recognized a similar need
to create a good public image around the world. The United
Kingdom uses the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), not only
to serve the needs of the domestic population, but also to
disseminate a British viewpoint over radio, television, and the
11
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Internet to non-British nationals. Newscasts may cover a story in
China, unrelated to the British Isles. However, commentary and
analysis can come from a British perspective, subtly bringing the
audience into the British approach.
Though highly-skewed to the Western ear, Radio Moscow
sought to establish the same relationship with the listener during
the Cold War. By explaining the Soviet perspective of an issue,
the audience could be drawn into Moscow’s outlook. While they
might not have agreed with the opinion, they would now at least
understand Moscow’s position as it related to their own. Thus, the
Soviet system became less intangible and ever so much more
rational.
The creation of borders and barriers to trade among nations
prohibits the flow of personal contact and information. A traveler
or good must be approved to exit and enter a country through a
visa or trade regime. However, radio waves, with the exception of
jamming and atmospheric phenomena, cannot be stopped at the
border. Thus, the medium of radio provides nations with the
ability to speak to peoples of another state without interaction with
the second government. While a government may not be able to
publish an inflammatory document in another country without
diplomatic problems, it may be able to broadcast the information to
the other country without reservation. Radio can bring
international relations from the international summit to the level of
the individual citizen.
Organization and Control of Radio Moscow
Radio broadcasting originating from the Soviet Union
operated on a multilevel system. At the bottom stood local
broadcasters, followed by stations in the various oblasts and krays.
At the top stood the central broadcasting system, under which
Radio Moscow fell.
In 1961, control over of broadcasting in the Soviet Union
was held by the State Committee of Radio and Television
Broadcasting.14 The Committee itself was a direct part of the
Council of Ministers of the USSR, which became Sovmin after
1946. According to S.V. Kaftanov, Chairman of the State
14
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Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting, reported in
1961 that the Committee’s tasks included: illuminating “domestic
and foreign policies of the Communist Party and of the Soviet
government,” “introduction of the radio listeners and television
viewers to the best works of literature, music and to the theatrical
art of the peoples of the USSR,” and “exposing the anti-national
essence of bourgeois ideology, morality and reactionary
propaganda”.15 By keeping the Committee chairman directly
responsible to the Council of Ministers, the state was able to
maintain control over all news, educational, cultural, and
entertainment programming broadcast over the state apparatus,
including Radio Moscow.
Programming Content: An Hour With Radio Moscow
While a history of the broadcasting service is important, a
dissection of a one-hour broadcast also yields great insight into
Radio Moscow’s role in Soviet policy. Typically, a few minutes
before the hour, an interval signal, usually the popular tune
Moscow Nights, would be broadcast to indicate the beginning of
programming. On the hour, the Kremlin chimes would be heard,
followed by a full news summary. The news summary would
usually take into account domestic events beginning with the
Communist Party, followed by stories from satellite nations, and
condemnations of events in the capitalist world. Following the
news, a feature would be presented, often a musical program or
commentary on current events. Topics often included the life of
the Soviet worker, United States arms policy, or the success of
farm programs in the Soviet republics. Musical programs regularly
highlighted Russian and Soviet composers and artists.16 Multiple
feature programs were offered throughout the hour, but none
compared with Moscow Mailbag. For 40 years, until his death in
2005, the English-language program was hosted by Joe Adamov
and featured listener questions ranging from the KGB to the artist
of a traditional Russian song. The broadcast would be concluded
with a recap of various program notes and then the cycle would
begin again with Moscow Nights.
15
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News Broadcasting
In the early years of the Cold War, as it had before, Radio
Moscow stuck to a news format. Gayle Durham Hollander
described some of the important topics in news broadcasts:
In 1960, Partiinaya Zhizn indicated the following
major change in procedure: “The central radio
stations in Moscow must first of all ensure timely
broadcasts of important political information,
effective commentary on domestic and foreign
events, the organization of various artistic
programs…Because radio should give the
population the important news before the
newspapers do, TASS has been instructed to
transmit news immediately to central and local
stations.”17
The “major change in procedure” she describes comes not from the
content of the radio programming, but rather the shift in
responsibility for major stories from the newspapers to radio
stations. Concerning newscasts, Kaftanov described the materials
to be found in news bulletins around 1960:
Materials pertaining to the Seven Year Plan for the
Development of the National Economy of the
USSR occupy a place of importance in all
presentations of “The Latest News”, about the
progress of work towards the fulfillment of that
plan, materials about how the Soviet people are
executing the decisions of the Party and the
government, information on themes dealing with
political, party, Komsomol, and trade union life.18
News programs generally stuck to the events within the
Communist Party first, then those stories that exemplified Soviet
17
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activities around the world, other socialist movements, and events
in the Warsaw Pact nations.
Though well past the early Cold War years of the 1950s
and 1960s, the newscast of July 1, 1985 provides evidence as to
how the Soviet Union portrayed itself over its global mouthpiece.
Headlines lead with information about the full session of the
Central Committee, followed by details of the meeting of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Next, a story about the
condemnation of the U.S. ‘Star Wars’ defense plan, a project
particularly detested by Moscow, by an international group of
physicians. Subsequent stories touched upon another mass
meeting in Greece condemning American deployment of missiles
to Europe and continuing problems following the Union Carbide
disaster in Bhopal, India.
The major global story of the day concerned the release of
39 American hostages from TWA Flight 847. However, the only
remote reference to the story was in Radio Moscow’s description
of U.S. negotiations with the French concerning terrorism, which it
described as an attempt at, “military action against a number of
sovereign nations and national liberation movements”.19
Likewise, it played down the removal of Grigori Romanov from
the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, regarded by many
to be Mikhail Gorbachev’s major rival. Instead, it stated that he
was, “retiring on pension on account of his health”.20 In this way,
news briefings were strictly controlled to follow the official
government line.
In addition to hourly newscasts, Radio Moscow presented
news magazines and special interest commentaries based on
current and historical news stories. In the 1985 broadcast, the
hourly newscast was followed by ’The Way We See It’ A Look at
the Soviet Union and the World, today devoted to contrasting U.S.
missile deployment with Soviet policy.21 Later commentaries dealt
with survivors of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima visiting Moscow
and thanking the government, “for their tremendous efforts to ease
world tensions” and the denunciation of the United States’
negative attitude toward arms negotiations by a British labor union.
19
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Jamming
In addition to the attention that the Soviet government gave
to its own international broadcasting, another indication of the
medium’s importance came in the government’s active jamming
campaign. In international broadcasting, the act of jamming refers
to one station or power deliberately broadcasting on a frequency
already in use by another station for the purposes of preventing the
signal from being received. While Radio Moscow’s signals were
rarely jammed by other nations, the Soviet Union actively jammed
the broadcasts of Western stations such as the BBC and the Voice
of America. The purpose of this was to prevent Soviet citizens
from being able to tune in the Western broadcasters, fearing
“Western cultural infiltration”.22 Indeed, they may have had cause
to worry: the Voice of America estimated 8 million Soviet citizens
listened into Western broadcasts.
In response to increased broadcasts directed to the Soviet
Union, a campaign of jamming the Voice of America and the BBC
from an estimated 150 transmitters within Soviet territory in 1949.
While this scale of jamming was effective, it was most certainly
not without cost. U.S. Government estimates in 1950 indicated
that the Soviet Union was spending $17.5 million a year on
jamming, or an amount equal to the Voice of America’s total
budget. Indeed, a U.S. diplomat speculated that the Soviets,
“devoted four times the capital equipment in transmitters and
monitoring stations and ten times the manpower to block Western
broadcasts” following the Voice of America’s increased efforts to
circumvent jamming.23
Had the Soviet Union not recognized the role that
international broadcasting could play in changing domestic public
opinion (or conversely, the role it could play in changing Western
public opinion), they would not have invested much needed capital
in jamming activities from the end of World War II right up until
1989. The United States also recognized this importance and used
it as a way of tying up Soviet resources in jamming and
international broadcasting.
22
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Reception in the United States
It is important to remember that broadcasting is a two-way
exchange: the broadcaster transmits and the listener must listen to
the signal. With this in mind, what was the reception of Radio
Moscow in one of its major targets, the United States? Don D.
Smith investigated the impact of Radio Moscow’s broadcasts in
the late 1960s. In his article “Some Effects of Radio Moscow’s
North American Broadcasts”, Smith revealed that there was a
“sizable audience”.24
Operating on the theory that Radio Moscow’s
programming was anti-American and did not meet general
standards of effective communication, Smith still found that
Americans who regularly listened to the programs were, none the
less, influenced by what they heard. In a previous survey of
general shortwave radio listening habits, he discovered that 9% of
the national sample had listened to foreign radio broadcasts within
the last year, with 6% of the sample having specifically listened to
political or news programming.25 When those indicating a high
interest in international affairs were surveyed, the most mentioned
station was Radio Moscow.26 Though they recognized that the
information was biased and propaganda-based, they also noted that
such broadcasts were, “useful in (1) making them more aware of
what other countries are thinking about the United States, (2)
giving them additional information about world affairs, and (3)
telling the other side of the story”.27 The majority of this audience
was made up of male professionals and those with at least some
college education.28
In the case of Smith’s Radio Moscow study, he found that,
despite the listening population’s biases about the content of
broadcasts, their direction of opinion consistently changed to favor
Moscow’s line. Seventy percent of the experimental group had
their views toward the Soviet Union and Moscow’s policies
24

Don D. Smith, "Some Effects of Radio Moscow's North American
Broadcasts," The Public Opinion Quarterly 34 (1970): 541.
25
Ibid., 540.
26
Ibid., 543.
27
Ibid., 545.
28
Ibid., 544.

109

change for the better, especially those who had held very negative
views to begin.29 One participant commented that the broadcasts
made them see that the Soviet Union was not just some, “’monster
with atomic bombs in each hand; instead they’re human, as
concerned with human affairs as we are’”.30
However, in one of his final conclusions, Smith remarked
that the effectiveness of Radio Moscow broadcasts could not
completely be attributed to the presentation of information.
The broadcasts seem to have had an effect, not
because of any particular skill in communication,
but because conditions in our own [American]
society had led the audience to hold unrealistic
negative images which, upon actual exposure, were
clearly refuted for many of the listeners.31
The crux of Smith’s point is that many of the respondents
were affected by the difference in opinions between Radio
Moscow and the American domestic media. As one reply put it,
“’When they [Radio Moscow] say something that is different from
what you read in American newspapers you begin comparing, and
sometimes what they say makes more sense’”.32 Many of those
who reported an unexpected change for the better in their opinion
of the Soviet Union based on Radio Moscow broadcasts also
reported that American media played a role in this change. Their
attention to shortwave broadcasts from the Soviet bloc exposed
them to other sources, which, on occasion, they found to be
credible or even more reasonable than what the American media
was saying.
In terms of strictly technical reception in the United States,
it is impossible to say how strong signals were received during the
1950s and 1960s. Quality of shortwave signals is subject to a host
of variables, including transmitting power, atmospheric conditions
(including weather), local terrain, and interference from other
29
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stations on nearby frequencies. There are indications that Radio
Moscow’s North American Service was consistently available
throughout the Continental United States, as reported by various
newspapers, university researchers, and regular listeners.33
While Radio Moscow’s in-house surveys have not yet
surfaced, the audience research of the major American
broadcasters has. The period studied by Smith was just the
beginning of larger-scale audience research by the Voice of
America and Radio Liberty. Methodology, and a system by which
to interview travelers from the Soviet Union, was only seriously
worked out by 1970. Until then, Soviet travelers in the West were
interviewed on an ad hoc basis, only allowing basic inferences
about listening habits.34 However, in the period between 1972 and
1990, the Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research (SAAOR)
unit of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was able to interview
upwards of 50,000 Soviet travelers in the West and more than
25,000 legal immigrants.35
The first audience quantification using the system was
between 1970 and 1972, in which SAAOR estimated that the
Voice of America reached 23% and Radio Liberty 11% of the
Soviet adult population weekly. By 1980, the VOA was estimated
to reach 15% and Radio Liberty, 8%.36 These numbers remained
consistent throughout the 1980s and 1990s for the VOA.
However, Radio Liberty experienced a climb from 7% in 1980 to
10% in 1985. This was followed by a sharp increase in listeners in
1989 to around 17% of the adult Soviet population.37 This is due
to the cessation of Soviet jamming of the station that had been
constant for decades. Overall, RFE/RL research of listening habits
found that audiences were dominated by urban males between ages
30 and 50, concentrated around Moscow, Leningrad, the Baltics,
and Trans-Caucuses.
33
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While these estimates have been disputed by some, the
statistics still show that there was a far greater audience to Western
radio stations such as the Voice of America and Radio Liberty in
the Soviet Union than there was for Soviet broadcasts in the United
States. Between 1970 and 1970, SAAOR found that the VOA was
reaching around 23% of the Soviet adult population. However,
Smith found that only 9% of the U.S. population listened to
international radio overall, and not one specific station.
Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn about Radio Moscow’s use
in the early Cold War? Perhaps the most important thing about
Radio Moscow’s international services was the value placed on
them by the Soviet Government. Even without a budgetary
measure of value, it is apparent that Radio Moscow was a vital part
of the Soviet broadcasting apparatus from the mid-1930s. By
1932, Soviet radio was broadcasting abroad in 11 languages, rising
to 29 by the close of the War. Officials in the Kremlin saw that
shortwave broadcasts were a way to spread Soviet opinion and
views on international affairs and to counteract the influence of the
capitalist system.
The link between the Soviet Government and Radio
Moscow is indisputable – the station was operated by the
government under the State Committee on Radio and Television
Broadcasting, within the central radio broadcasting system. News
broadcasts, a staple of Radio Moscow’s programming since the
Great Patriotic War, were still subject to pre-broadcast censorship
by the government and concentrated on party and government
news.
Finally, though the audience for Radio Moscow’s
broadcasts was rather insignificant in the United States, the station
did manage to reach some of its goals. Though listeners reported
that they did not experience a change of heart regarding the Soviet
Union, they did report that some of their overall opinions had
changed. In the end, the overall listenership to Radio Moscow was
relatively small, seeing as the total nationwide audience for all
international political broadcasting in November of 1966 equaled
2% of Americans, or about 2 million people. While listeners
reported one of their top favorites to be Radio Moscow, the
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station’s listener base would be significantly less than 2 million,
and thus not drastically altering overall U.S. public opinion. This
is in sharp contrast to the Soviet audience for Radio Liberty and
the Voice of America. However, Radio Moscow’s value outside of
the United States is relatively unknown. Many throughout the
world, particularly in the developing world, tuned in regularly to
Moscow’s broadcasts.
Despite a relatively small group of listeners in the United States
and the role of censorship played in listeners’ opinions, the role of
Radio Moscow in the USSR’s foreign policy apparatus cannot be
underplayed. The attention paid to Radio Moscow by the central
government and its rapid development through the 1930s and
1940s provides compelling evidence for its value to the state. The
station’s broadcasts provided invaluable insight into Soviet life for
Western governments and the general public.
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